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Extensive research has shown that European multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) have a propensity to avoid collective employee repre-
sentation when going abroad. This study investigates whether
Global Framework Agreements (GFAs) can reverse this pattern by
comparing how four European MNEs—two from Germany and two
from Sweden—implement GFAs in the United States, a country with
weak collective representation rights. The authors find that an
MNE’s home country labor relations (LR) system mediates whether
GFAs support collective representation in the United States.
Sweden’s monistic LR system, in which unions are the dominant
organizations legally representing workers, gives unions the power
to directly influence the negotiation and implementation of GFAs.
By contrast, Germany’s dualistic LR system, in which unions and
works councils share worker representation, weakens the influence
of unions on implementing the GFA. MNEs’ home country LR sys-
tems thus influence how transnational instruments are used to
improve collective representation in host countries.
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Responding to rising concerns about weak compliance with laborstandards in global value chains, innovative transnational regulations
such as Global Framework Agreements (GFAs) have been created to spread
workers’ rights, particularly the right to unionize and bargain collectively,
across the production locations of multinational enterprises (MNEs). GFAs
were developed by Global Union Federations (GUFs) and pose a challenge
to unilateral approaches toward labor relations (LR) norms because they
hold signatory MNEs directly responsible for adhering to core labor stan-
dards as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO)
(Papadakis 2011). Although such global instruments typically target devel-
oping countries, the experience with GFAs shows that enacting freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining effectively is also proble-
matic in the United States (Fichter and Stevis 2013). Studying whether
GFAs are able to influence LR practices in the U.S. subsidiaries of signatory
MNEs is thus critical for our understanding of the possibility of diffusing
workers’ rights across the globe (Fichter, Stevis, and Helfen 2012). For U.S.
LR, GFAs constitute a possibility to counteract the domestic curtailing of
labor rights (Compa 2008, 2012).
Studies on the transfer of collective representation practices have shown
that U.S. MNEs tend to adopt union avoidance strategies in European coun-
tries with strong statutory support for collective representation (e.g., Mu¨ller
1998; Mu¨ller-Camen et al. 2001). Conversely, European MNEs lean toward
adapting to the more voluntaristic LR practices prevailing in the United
States (e.g., Cooke 2001; Human Rights Watch 2010). Yet the exact inter-
play of institutions, interests, and identities of actors in such transfer settings
needs to be further examined (Do¨rrenba¨cher and Geppert 2011; Geppert
and Do¨rrenba¨cher 2014). The way in which actors draw on transnational
institutions to influence the dynamics of transfer constitutes a particularly
promising new area of research in this context (Djelic and Quack 2003;
Tempel and Walgenbach 2007).
This study compares four MNEs from two European countries and exam-
ines how they translate the collective representation practices inscribed in GFAs into
their U.S. subsidiaries. We find that the monistic, union-based system of labor
representation in Sweden equipped labor actors with more opportunities to
translate collective representation practices to the United States than did
the dualistic German system.1 Swedish unions regarded the GFA as an
instrument to move beyond existing corporate social responsibility practices
and used direct influence over headquarters (HQ) management to negoti-
ate comparatively stronger GFAs and to enforce this commitment through
1German LR are characterized by a duality of employee representation—that is, representation is for-
mally separated in unions and union-independent works councils. By law, the German works council is
elected by workers and is obliged to honor the best interest of employees and the firm in exerting its
codetermination rights. Firms are obliged to bear the administrative costs of works council elections and
operations. Sweden has a monistic system in which unions represent workers from the shop floor up to
the board level.
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collaboration with U.S. unions and GUFs. By contrast, HQ management in
the German cases was able to subsume GFAs under existing CSR policies by
negotiating GFAs with those labor actors that accepted management prero-
gative and by marginalizing the role of GUFs. We interpret these qualitative
findings as indicating that the difference between monistic and dualistic LR
systems is relevant for understanding the institutional and micro-political
dynamics around GFAs or other transnational instruments of labor
regulation.
Politics and Institutions in the Transfer of LR Practices
from and to the United States
Studies in a neo-institutionalist tradition attribute problems with transfer-
ring MNE management practices cross-nationally to a high cognitive, nor-
mative, and regulative institutional distance between home and host
countries that expose subsidiaries to conflicting demands for internal and
external legitimacy (Kostova 1999). Similarly, comparative institutional anal-
yses (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001) stress that particular institutional config-
urations in MNE home countries, broadly classified as liberal and
coordinated market economies, shape transfer patterns. Going beyond
these structural arguments, detailed case studies reveal that transfer out-
comes vary among sectors, firms, or specific practices because each context
provides different incentives and opportunities for supporting or resisting
the transfer process (e.g., Pries 2003; Do¨rrenba¨cher and Geppert 2006;
Brewster, Wood, and Brookes 2008; Meardi et al. 2009). Micro-political
aspects are considered as particularly prominent in the transfer of LR
because of the institutionalized interest conflicts between management and
labor actors (Ferner 1997; Ferner, Almond, and Colling 2005; Geppert and
Williams 2006; Morgan and Kristensen 2006; Edwards, Colling, and Ferner
2007; Ferner, Edwards, and Temple 2012; Edwards, Marginson, and Ferner
2013; Edwards, Tregaskis et al. 2013).
United States multinationals that come to Europe, for instance, are said
to transfer a unilateral HRM model characterized by nonunionism as a stan-
dardized ‘‘best practice’’ (Pudelko and Harzing 2007), but they are poten-
tially constrained by existing collective LR in local subsidiaries (Ferner,
Almond, Colling, and Edwards 2005). These constraints are stronger in
manufacturing than in service-sector firms (Tempel et al. 2006) and are tol-
erated more in countries with enterprise-based rather than sectoral repre-
sentation systems (Royle 1998; Colling, Gunnigle, Quintanilla, and Tempel
2006). Conversely, MNEs from coordinated market economies such as
Germany are expected to leave LR practices to the discretion of local man-
agement when they go abroad (Ferner, Quintanilla, and Varul 2001), some-
times even strategically using subsidiaries for reverse diffusion of Anglo-
Saxon practices (Ferner and Varul 2000).
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Compared with the vast amount of research on German-, Japanese-,
British-, and U.S.-based MNEs, there is less but growing evidence on the
transfer patterns in Scandinavian MNEs. In early international business
research, Hedlund (1981) pointed to a weak influence of Swedish HQ on
global operations because of an informal management style and a lack of
formal planning in Swedish MNEs. Relying on a case study of a Swedish
high-tech MNE, Hayden and Edwards (2001) showed that this participatory
management style was transferred to foreign subsidiaries while at the same
time Anglo-Saxon–type performance pay systems were introduced. Rolfsen
(2013) demonstrated that a Norwegian MNE transferred partnership prac-
tices to its French-Canadian subsidiaries, i.e., to a host country with typically
more adversarial labor relations than Norway, arguing that partnership was
fundamental to the firm’s business model.
On the basis of this literature one would expect that European firms have
the capacity to transfer collective representation practices to their U.S. sub-
sidiaries but may not choose to do so in practice, even though most commit
themselves to support freedom of association and collective bargaining prin-
ciples in their home operations. In the United States, foreign firms can eas-
ily operate as nonunion entities because the U.S. labor law system allows the
adoption of state-level right-to-work laws that complicate union representa-
tion in the workplace (Katz and Colvin 2011; Hegji 2012). However, this
conjecture requires further elaboration in the context of new transnational
instruments such as GFAs that support the spread of collective representa-
tion by formally empowering labor representatives as a driver of transfer
processes.
Global Framework Agreements and the Transfer of Collective
Representation Practices
Following the ILO’s 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Rights and the ILO’s
strategic focus on five core labor standards from among all ILO conventions
(International Labour Office 2002), GFAs concentrate mainly on employ-
ees’ right to organize and bargain collectively, nondiscrimination, and the
prohibition of child and forced labor. To date more than 100 GFAs have
been signed, currently mostly by European MNEs (European Commission
2015). GFAs are formally cosigned by GUFs, industry-wide international fed-
erations of unions representing millions of workers from dozens of coun-
tries (Stevis and Boswell 2008). Home country unions, influential works
councils, or European Works Councils (EWCs) often lead GFA negotiations
(e.g., Helfen and Sydow 2013), a development that indicates complex
micro-political actor constellations.
Existing research indicates that MNEs can leave the enforcement of the
GFA to the discretion of local actors, undermining their effectiveness, espe-
cially in highly decentralized and fragmented value chains (Davies et al.
2011; Riisgaard and Hammer 2011). In other cases, as in the unfolding
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situation at the Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee, GFAs do
effect a transfer of collective representation practices, but this effort is heav-
ily constrained by resistance from local politics (Compa 2014).
Thus, bringing a GFA to bear in local conditions is often less a matter of
directly transferring particular institutions, such as German works councils,
to the United States than a matter of ‘‘translating’’ (Sahlin-Andersson and
Engwall 2002) freedom of association and collective bargaining principles
into a local context. In our setting, one form of translating would be the
adoption of a sustained dialogue between host country management and
unions and engagement in joint information and monitoring activities, even
when these are not accompanied by unionization or collective bargaining.
A second, stronger form of translating is the adoption of ‘‘positive neutral-
ity,’’ whereby the U.S. subsidiary does not raise obstacles to union cam-
paigns and actively communicates to its employees that joining a union is
acceptable. The continuation of unionization in the event of an acquisition
would also be a form of translation as companies often use acquisitions to
weaken unions. Translation might be hampered by subtle forms of MNE
opposition such as tolerating informal union-avoidance strategies or pre-
venting union access to employees at the workplace (Compa and Feinstein
2012).
Research Setting and Methodology
Comparative Case Study Design
The MNEs
We have selected four cases for systematic comparative analysis, dubbed
PapCorpSE, ConCorpSE, BuildCorpDE, and RubberCorpDE, from a larger
sample of 22 GFAs signed by European companies that we analyzed
between 2008 and 2011 (for an overview see Sydow et al. 2014). Given the
relative novelty of GFAs and our aim to untangle institutional and micro-
political dynamics, we followed a qualitative approach. We selected our
cases depending on their country of origin—Germany (DE) or Sweden
(SE)—because MNEs from these countries were among the first movers in
the adoption of GFAs and both have strong but varying LR systems. Our
cases also come from two sectors: PapCorpSE and RubberCorpDE are
mainly producers of consumer and industrial goods, whereas ConCorpSE
and BuildCorpDE operate in the construction industry. Our design there-
fore includes one German and one Swedish MNE in each of two sectors
(see Table 1).
We control for one host country setting, the United States. All the compa-
nies have accelerated their presence in the United States during the last 15
years largely through acquisitions and are present in different states with dif-
ferent labor laws. RubberCorpDE has the most facilities in the United
States, while PapCorpSE has the fewest. PapCorpSE has globally integrated
product divisions, and ConCorpSE runs decentralized but also globally


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































integrated divisions. Both German firms have decentralized product divi-
sions; however, RubberCorpDE exercises strong central influence over its
divisions through capital investments. The two construction companies are
very similar in terms of size and operations and tend to hire union labor in
locations where unions are strong and nonunion labor where they are weak.
Both focus on large projects, which tend to be more unionized than resi-
dential projects (Cooper 2012).
Home Country Labor Relations
The selected German and Swedish MNEs exemplify Western European col-
lective labor representation, which is characterized by comparatively high
levels of coverage through industry-wide collective bargaining, union repre-
sentation in corporate boards, and consultation through works and union
councils (Jackson and Deeg 2008). Although Sweden shows signs of change
in its overall business systems, its LR institutions remain rooted in the coun-
try’s rather strong social democratic tradition (Pontusson 1997). Most nota-
bly, Sweden shows higher union densities and collective bargaining
coverage than Germany (Schmitt and Mitukiewicz 2012). In 2008, unioniza-
tion in Sweden stood at 68% and collective bargaining coverage at around
90% of the dependent workforce, whereas in Germany unionization is close
to 20% and collective bargaining coverage (including firm-level agree-
ments) is about 60% (European Commission 2013: 23).
The Swedish and the German LR systems also diverge significantly
regarding the role of trade unions. In Germany, trade unions are responsi-
ble for collective bargaining at the sectoral and firm level, whereas works
councils are responsible for codetermination in the workplace and have a
say on issues such as dismissals, work organization, and restructuring
(Thelen 1993; Frege 2003). In Sweden, trade unions represent workers
from the workplace to the industry level, and local union bodies also form
the backbone of company codetermination (Brulin 1995; Kjelberg 1998;
Nergaard et al. 2009; Ilsoe 2012). A dualistic system like the German one
provides workers with an added layer of representation, but it can also
engender conflicting dynamics between unions and works councils because
the latter are legally obliged to act in the interest of the workers and the
company but are not obliged to be union members (Behrens 2009).
Host Country Labor Relations
For U.S. unions, the primary goal of having GFAs is to support them in get-
ting recognition and collective bargaining. In unionized firms, employees
enjoy legal standing based on the National Labor Relations Act (1935), but
these rights were significantly limited in subsequent periods (e.g., Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947). Multiemployer agreements and pattern bargaining—
common during the post–World War II era—have become rare (Katz 1993;
Eaton and Kriesky 1998). Even firm-level collective agreements are difficult
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to negotiate because frequently several unions claim jurisdiction.
Additionally, unions fear that the conflict resolution system—organized
around the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)—works to the advan-
tage of management (Shimabukuro 2012). In combination, the antiunion
sentiment of business and of political elites at the national and state levels
and a weak collective labor law create a formidable challenge to collective
worker representation (Bronfenbrenner 2009; Marens 2012; Wessels 2013;
Hogler 2015). A senior union official aptly captured this challenge:
The [United States is] unique when it comes to the situation of GFAs, because
the management always claims that the United States is a unique market. . . .
And of course they don’t want to have the European trade union tradition spil-
ling over through a GFA. (ConCorpSE union at HQ)
Global Union Federations
GUFs depend on the strength of their respective affiliates. For GUFs, GFAs
are one of the main instruments to engage with global labor regulation
because they legitimize GUFs’ role as interlocutors for MNEs at the transna-
tional level. The MNEs in our study deal with two GUFs: the International
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions
(ICEM—now IndustriAll) and the Building and Wood Workers’
International (BWI). Together, the ICEM2 (16 GFAs) and the BWI (19)
accounted for a good third of all GFAs signed up until 2013. When it
became part of IndustriAll, the ICEM had 20 million members unionized in
467 affiliated unions in 132 countries (Platzer and Mu¨ller 2011). The ICEM
took a pronounced social partnership or ‘‘pragmatic international solidar-
ity’’ approach to GFAs, strengthening ongoing social dialogue (ICEM
2010). BWI operates in construction, building materials, and woodworking
industries with 12 million members organized in 318 national affiliates from
130 countries. The BWI has sought to engage with management collabora-
tively in the context of GFAs—for example, by focusing on issues of health
and safety (e.g., Hellmann 2007).
Data Collection and Analysis
We collected and analyzed qualitative data from a variety of sources (see
Table 2).
Interviews
We conducted 41 interviews, of which 17 were with labor and management
representatives at the MNE HQ level, and 13 were in U.S. subsidiaries. In
2The ICEM is now part of IndustriAll global union, founded on June 19, 2012 (http://www.industriall-
union.org).
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Table 2. Case Study Database
Company Interviews Dates conducted Length
Case-specific data
BuildCorpDE HQ management (1)
HQ labor representatives (5)
– Works council board representative
– Works council
– Union negotiator, international
secretary
– Union representative














ConCorpSE HQ management (1)




















U.S. labor representatives (5)
– Head of international affairs
– State-level union leader
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PapCorpSE HQ management (1)




U.S. labor representatives (5)
– Head of national organizing
– Head of sectoral organizing
– National union staff, international
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– Head of international affairs






















RubberCorpDE HQ management (2)
– Head of division
– VP HRM
HQ labor representatives (3)
– Union representative
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EUROPEAN LABOR RELATIONS AND GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS 639
the United States we talked to unions that have organized one or more sites
of the respective companies. On the management side we usually had inter-
views with HR managers, but we were not able to get access to local manage-
ment in two of our cases. In addition, we interviewed seven GUF
representatives responsible for the respective MNEs. These officers usually
aggregate the experiences of the involved affiliates and are key informants on
corporate strategies beyond single countries and MNEs. We also interviewed
four field experts for background information on the three countries’ LR.
Interviews addressed the overall CSR policy of the company, the role and
tradition of labor relations, and the GFA process. We also asked unions about
their international division of labor and their assessment of GFAs as a tool
for changing LR. The identification of instances of conflict, such as in local
approaches to union recognition, was particularly challenging. We therefore
relied on a multi-source strategy using interview as well as archival data.
Complementary Data
To gain more insights on U.S. practices we sought and received specific
information from host country and global unionists. One unionist, for
instance, provided us with the neutrality agreement between PapCorpSE
and the U.S. union as well as detailed data on locations and employment of
the various plants. Another provided us with copies of exchanges between
U.S. unions, GUFs, and management in the ConCorpSE case. We have
video footage of a RubberCorpDE subsidiary manager demanding that
union organizers leave the premises of a targeted plant. We examined
Department of Labor and NLRB databases on collective agreements and
labor disputes. An intensive review of trade journals, local business news
Table 2. Continued




Swedish employer association representative (1)
German employer association representative (1)
International employer organization representative (1)
Confederation of U.S. trade unions representative (1)
Workshop
participation
2 GUF workshops (2009, 2010)
Participation in BWI (2011) Global Conference on MNCs and Public
Infrastructure Projects
German employer association workshop (2010)
Host country labor-management workshop (for U.S. in 2011)
Additional
documents
ILO publications (e.g., ILO 2002, 2008)
Employer association policy statements (e.g., IOE 2007; ITC 2010; BDA 2011)
Global union programmatic documents (e.g., ICFTU 2004; ITUC 2006; BWI 2007;
ICEM 2008, 2010)
GFA texts, codes of conduct, global supplier standards, annual reports, corporate
and GUFs’ websites, newspaper articles, local agreements, U.S. National Labor
Relations Board, Board Decisions. Accessed at https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-
decisions/board-decisions (May 18, 2015)
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media, local government websites, and national and local union websites
provided us with additional information on the various subsidiaries. We also
participated in several workshops.
Analytical Process
We started our analysis by comparing the GFAs’ substantive regulations and
what they prescribe in terms of implementation—that is, the scope of cover-
age as well as rules for information, monitoring, and conflict escalation.
Then we examined actual instances of conflict resolution and monitoring





The GFAs we examined belong to the group of first-generation GFAs signed
between 2000 and 2004, with RubberCorpDE and BuildCorpDE signing as
early as 2000. Although managerial support varied, all MNEs considered
signing a GFA a useful tool for corporate responsibility.
Both Swedish MNEs were explicitly concerned about employees as impor-
tant stakeholders, with PapCorpSE stressing that responsible corporate
behavior had already been ‘‘in our blood’’ (PapCorpSE HR manager). The
German MNEs, in contrast, were mainly concerned about their public
image. RubberCorpDE HR management explained that ‘‘shareholders do
not want to be ashamed of their corporation’’ and emphasized the owner
family’s responsibility. Yet the company was skeptical about a GFA, high-
lighting the huge economic, social, and legal differences between national
labor markets and between ILO conventions and national labor laws. As the
owner stated, ‘‘We did not promise anything in the GFA beyond what we
are already doing.’’ BuildCorpDE welcomed the GFA as an opportunity to
keep alleged violations of labor standards an internal affair and to legitimize
self-imposed obligations and CSR initiatives.
MNE Labor Relations
The underlying labor relations help explain the different attitudes of the
four MNEs examined here. PapCorpSE and ConCorpSE both have a history
of cooperative relations and open dialogue with unions in their home mar-
ket, with unionization rates well above the already high Swedish average.
PapCorpSE’s home union is strongly involved in corporate decision making
and was able to veto a code of conduct drafted by the company in 2003:
I know there was tension within the company with representatives from the
United States, they wanted this wording in this code of conduct. So we said no,
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we will not accept this, but if you conclude a Framework Agreement with us
where we can close the door on union busting we will accept this code of con-
duct. (PapCorpSE union at HQ)
ConCorpSE management and labor representatives also stress the his-
tory of a trust-based, social partnership approach in Scandinavia, though
not necessarily in other regions. Similar to PapCorpSE, the Swedish
union, collaborating with the BWI and the EWC, was responsible for
negotiating the GFA and securing a strong commitment by management
to labor standards, which later included the development of a global
health and safety strategy.
The German BuildCorpDE is engaged in a permanent dialogue with
unions but one largely restricted to its core business units in Germany, where
either the workforce is highly unionized or unions can benefit from other
institutionalized power resources such as works councils or BuildCorpDE’s
social partnership tradition. The GFA was initiated by the head of the
national union, who sits on the supervisory board. However, the agreement
was considered a continuation of LR at BuildCorpDE, which are character-
ized by an informal ad hoc approach in dealing with problems as they occur:
Binding standards, a negotiation body—we don’t have such things, this is not
how we work. We have guidelines, they are published internally, everybody
knows them. . . . If there are problems, we have ways of dealing with them.
(BuildCorpDE works council supervisory board representative at HQ)
The GFA, in the words of this representative, was not negotiated by GUFs,
but the BWI’s standard template was internally adapted in informal talks
‘‘without any red tape.’’
RubberCorpDE is more skeptical about union involvement in corporate
governance bodies but applies industry-wide collective bargaining and is
confronted with an influential works council that draws legitimacy from a
highly unionized workforce in HQ manufacturing operations:
We prefer to talk to our people directly instead of through institutions. . . . That
doesn’t mean that we do not accept unions at the table, but we have a problem
with unions monopolizing communication. (RubberCorp HQ management)
The GFA was initiated by the head of the works council, also head of the
EWC, who had been actively collaborating with representatives from ICEM
and U.S. unions. However, management shifted toward negotiating with the
national union (as representing the ICEM), and after a two-year period,
the result was a much weaker agreement than originally envisioned by the
works councilor:
We wanted to be much more specific on sanction mechanisms and escalation
procedures in cases of violations. At the end, these things were left unspecified,
because the ICEM and [union] thought it would be better to have a weak
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agreement than no agreement. (RubberCorp head of works council at HQ and
of EWC)
The national union representative commented on this process: ‘‘The works
council clearly must have felt thwarted’’ (RubberCorpDE union representa-
tive at HQ).
GFA Content
The GFAs differ in the way substantive rules are stated as well as on scope
and procedural rules.
Substantive Rules
All GFAs include core ILO conventions such as employees’ right to orga-
nize, collective bargaining, prohibition of child or forced labor, and nondis-
crimination. The PapCorpSE’s agreement details labor standards as
fundamental human rights. For example,
[PapCorpSE] recognizes the fundamental right of every employee to decide on
whether or not to be represented by a recognized trade union of their choice.
[The company] also recognizes and respects basic trade union rights covering
freedom of association, right to organize and the right to engage in collective
bargaining. (PapCorpSE GFA)
In contrast, ConCorpSE stresses that ‘‘employee rights to form or join
trade unions shall be recognized in accordance with each respective coun-
try’s laws and principles’’ (ConCorpSE GFA). The RubberCorpDE GFA, in
addition to adhering to ILO standards, stresses the functionality of good LR
for long-term economic success:
Confidence and cooperation between management, employees and their repre-
sentatives, innovation and flexibility in work organization are the basis for the
employees’ future success and that of [the company]. (RubberCorpDE GFA)
BuildCorpDE merely lists eight labor standards as bullet points.
Scope
The major issue regarding scope is whether, in addition to the direct opera-
tions of the respective MNE, the agreement also covers entities in which it is a
majority/minority shareholder and also covers suppliers and contractors or
subcontractors. Here the PapCorpSE agreement is relatively weak but specific:
This agreement covers all activities where PapCorpSE has direct control. Where
PapCorpSE does not have direct control, it will exercise its best efforts in order
to secure compliance with the standards set out in this agreement. (PapCorpSE
agreement)
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The ConCorpSE agreement extends to all subsidiaries but only in a
weaker form to contractors and subcontractors. Similarly, RubberCorpDE
has restricted the agreement to those entities in which it has management
prerogative, seeking to exclude joint ventures, the most important of which
is in the United States. Additionally, the agreement applies only to direct
employees. BuildCorpDE, in contrast, states that the ILO standards should
also apply to all contractors and subcontractors.
[BuildCorpDE] acknowledges that it . . . also shares responsibility for the condi-
tions under which the employees of its contractual partners do their work.
(BuildCorpDE agreement)
Procedural Rules
Despite its narrower scope, the PapCorpSE agreement stands out in its
detailed procedures for handling the agreement. The parties use a ‘‘review
meeting’’ among management and labor representatives that occurs every
two years, and a formal complaint-handling procedure is specified.
ConCorpSE also has a formal complaints procedure involving a reference
group that meets twice a year, consisting of representatives from
ConCorpSE central management, a committee of the EWC, a GUF repre-
sentative, and a representative from the union at the HQ. The complaint-
handling process includes formal arbitration, which is still an exception
among GFAs.
In contrast, RubberCorpDE’s procedure for handling complaints remains
unspecified in the agreement except for a reference to annual meetings
and ad hoc communication between management and union representa-
tives. Even more informally, BuildCorpDE complaints are tackled case by
case, and management assumes general authority for devising appropriate
measures to deal with reported violations.
GFA Implementation
The relations between PapCorpSE and the relevant U.S. union were quite
contentious during the late 1990s and early 2000s but improved as a result
of a national agreement negotiated in the shadow of the 2004 GFA.
According to the national union leader managing the relations with
PapCorpSE, the GFA, combined with the national agreement, facilitated
the unionization of a plant in Arizona, a right-to-work state, in 2007 as well
as the negotiation of a 2009 collective agreement in a New York location.
While local managers in these and other sites acquired by the company are
still learning how to adjust to more collaborative LR, the relations in the
company’s only ‘‘greenfield’’ investment, also in a right-to-work state, are
described as being as collaborative as those in Sweden. The U.S. union and
PapCorpSE also established a joint advisory committee to ensure compli-
ance in all its unionized sites. At the same time, two cases demonstrate the
challenges of LR translation in the face of local LR. One plant is not
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covered by the national agreement, although it is not located in a right-to-
work state. According to HQ management,
[Our] factories in the U.S. are all unionized. But this part is not. . . . That’s not
. . . [because] they’re not allowed. We have the same practices all over. We will
of course welcome unions, but it has to come from the people. (PapCorpSE HQ
HR manager)
Unionists explained that the company adheres to high standards there and
that the limited number of workers (about 160) makes an organizing drive
daunting.
Another plant is nonunionized despite being located in a highly union-
ized state. This site is used by the U.S. union as a test case to petition the
NLRB for the certification of a minority union. Minority unions—those that
represent only their members—have not had legal standing under U.S.
labor law, an interpretation that this ongoing legal case is challenging. This
PapCorpSE site and case might bring about a foundational change in U.S.
LR, provided that the case survives the federal court system.
ConCorpSE’s record of collective LR in the United States is less profound
than PapCorpSE’s, but over time the settling of disputes and the establishment
of a regular dialogue involving U.S. unions and management indicate that a
translation is taking place. Local management in the United States has tended
to be more reactive than proactive, catalyzing interventions from the HQ:
There have been a couple instances where [ConCorpSE HQ] had to step in and
talk to the local management, explain to them, look, you need to have a more
cooperative attitude towards unions, what are you scared of and what is the
problem?(GUF representative for ConCorpSE)
In one case, global management joined the GUF in bringing the local
unions and the local management together in regular talks about national
issues after a dispute in Florida escalated into a union campaign against the
company. Florida, a right-to-work state, is particularly problematic:
It is a complicated situation. They have very weak labor rights and, frankly, we
have got weak coverage there, so we have to expand. We have to work with trade
unions not affiliated, so we really need to try and broaden our coverage with all
the buildings trades in the U.S. if we want to make the agreement more mean-
ingful there. (US Union BWI representative)
HQ management also intervened at a ConCorpSE facility in California
where local management had refused to bargain in an attempt to change
an existing agreement. The president of the home union urged central
management to intervene, and ConCorpSE reacted by sending a delega-
tion. The home union plays an important role in intervening with HQ man-
agement, either directly or through the BWI, thus brokering transnational
union collaboration. The U.S. unions appreciate the support they get from
the Swedish union.
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In a proactive move, BWI organized a meeting involving ConCorpSE,
BuildCorpDE, and host country unions to institutionalize a process of GFA
implementation in 2006. ConCorpSE’s U.S. management was not enthusias-
tic, but under pressure from HQs and home country unions, it has slowly
moved in the direction of dialogue. Beginning in 2011, U.S. management
has agreed to annual meetings, the first of which took place in 2012. These
meetings also involve visits to worksites. More recent (2015) information
affirms that these meetings continue and that the GFA is being renegotiated
to take into account U.S. LR.
These developments contrast with the situation at BuildCorpDE. A parti-
cipant told us that the host country CEO acted as if he had never heard of
the GFA at the 2006 meeting, leading the global CEO to remind him of the
commitment. Generally, however, the global HQ is less willing to impose its
wishes on key subsidiaries than ConCorpSE. In fact, interviewees on the
labor side often referred to phone calls as the most effective means to com-
municate with management about alleged violations.
I don’t know what you expect about how things work in corporations. We get
contacts via the Geneva organization [i.e., the GUF] and via the national union.
The national union also has a network within their union federation. Someone
will hear something. These instances will then be collected and solved.
(BuildCorpDE supervisory board employee representative)
This corporate attitude is reinforced by the fact that all labor representa-
tives at BuildCorpDE repeatedly stress the harmonious, informal way in
which the GFA is used, underscoring how deeply labor actors at
BuildCorpDE are absorbed into comanagement. According to a U.S. union
representative, the German union and the works council are much more
reluctant to connect directly with U.S. unions than are the Swedish unions
at ConCorpSE.
RubberCorpDE emphasized from the beginning that it would not export
German LR and that it sought to adhere to host country LR institutions. This
approach led to pronounced conflicts during the late 1990s, just before the
GFA was signed, when the company purchased a unionized plant covered by
a collective agreement and sought to avoid communication with the union as
well as its obligations under the collective agreement. Subsequently, the GFA
was an important tool for local unions to put pressure on RubberCorpDE to
respect the collective agreement in that plant and in trying to organize
another plant, but local management actively resisted the GFA:
I do recall when the trade unions came knocking . . . because RubberCorpDE
had signed this agreement. That should give them free access to our associates
and an open door policy. And that open door policy doesn’t really exist in the
U.S. (RubberCorpDE U.S. subsidiary management)
Instead, the GFA did not prevent global and U.S. management from avoid-
ing meaningful dialogue:
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In the U.S., it is more like that the management would not even have talked to
us about a different behavior towards local organizing activities without this
agreement. That’s very clear. From time to time, the HQ management signals
that the agreement should be interpreted differently in the U.S. Because
RubberCorpDE was the only company with such an agreement and none of the
U.S. companies had signed such an agreement. (RubberCorpDE EWC
representative)
Despite the initial unwillingness of both global and U.S. management to
adhere to the GFA, the collaboration of U.S. and Canadian unions with the
ICEM forced global management to acknowledge its obligations and partici-
pate in a meeting in 2008 between management and unions where they
agreed to amend the GFA through the inclusion of explicit neutrality lan-
guage. However, later developments documented in the NLRB cases data-
base suggest that neutrality is not necessarily observed on the ground. In its
effort to defeat a 2013 unionization vote in one of its Ohio plants, U.S. man-
agement asked the NLRB to count votes by summer interns. The union
won the vote, but the attitude of the subsidiary’s management sheds some
light on problems with adequate translation of collective representation
practices.
Table 3 summarizes our key findings.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our findings on the dynamics engendered by GFAs in four European
MNEs allow us to elaborate on how institutions, interests, and identities of
actors at different levels influence the translation of collective representa-
tion practices into the United States. Overall, Swedish unions seemed more
equipped than German ones to push for a stronger agreement and involved
themselves more directly in making the GFA operative in the United States.
Our analysis suggests that the different LR institutions in the two home
countries provided management and labor actors with different opportunity
structures to weaken or strengthen a GFA. This finding also adds to our
existing knowledge on the success of GFAs in the United States and the role
of foreign MNEs for U.S. LR more broadly.
First, in both German cases labor actors had a comparatively weaker
influence on the GFA because management could choose its preferred part-
ner, shifting from the works councils to the union level in RubberCorpDE
and holding the GUF at bay by privileging home country unions and works
councils in BuildCorpDE. A dual representational system thus gives manage-
ment some flexibility to choose those partners who are more inclined to act
in accordance with its interests. Swedish unions, in contrast, had a strong
influence over management in both cases and actively involved the GUFs.
Second, the national unions in both countries had a different attitude
toward the GFA, with Swedish unions appreciating the formal ‘‘bite’’ of the
agreements vis-a`-vis unilateral CSR activities and German unions keeping







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the GFA relatively informal, in line with existing CSR systems. Again, this
difference points toward the salience of different home country LR.
Operating within the dualistic system, German unions are more reluctant to
bring global unions into the GFA processes within MNEs to avoid jeopardiz-
ing the complex balance of power among HQ-level management factions,
influential works councils, and themselves. The dualistic German system is
thus difficult to translate into a monistic system such as that in the United
States not only because of institutional incompatibilities but also because of
power relations at the HQ level. Again, this finding supports the salience of
actors’ interests and identities in transfer processes (e.g., Geppert and
Do¨rrenba¨cher 2014).
Third, compared with the two Swedish unions, German unions took a
rather passive approach toward international solidarity. One explanation is
that Swedish unions strive to foreclose a ‘‘reverse diffusion’’ (Edwards,
Almond et al. 2005) of weaker practices back to Sweden and act proactively.
Another explanation might be that new transnational institutions and actors
add further complexities to the dualistic LR in Germany and are thus evalu-
ated more critically than in Sweden (for a similar argument regarding
EWCs see Marginson, Lavelle et al. 2013). Finally, this pattern might be indi-
cative of Germany’s gradual move from a coordinated to a dualistic market
economy (e.g., Streeck 2009; Palier and Thelen 2010).
Home country LR institutions do not determine transfer processes, and
additional factors need to be taken into consideration. First, HQ manage-
ment’s commitment to labor rights and an open dialogue with unions may
develop independently of whether the LR system is dualistic or monistic.
Some German firms, such as Volkswagen, are actively trying to translate
their LR style into the United States but face strong local resistance.
Conversely, not all Swedish signatories of GFAs are active promoters of col-
laborative LR. IKEA, for instance, is generally not a union-friendly company,
and it has continued this approach in the United States (Vail 2012). Even
in this scenario, however, collaboration between the U.S. woodworking
union, its Swedish counterpart, and the BWI resulted in union certification
in the U.S. facility of the company’s woodworking division, Swedwood,
demonstrating the influence of Swedish unions.
Second, the Swedish MNEs we examined do not have an equally strong
implementation record in other countries such as Colombia and Russia,
where the opportunities to collaborate with local unions are more limited
(Helfen, Schu¨ßler, and Botzem 2015). Likewise, host country unions need
to coordinate their initiatives with each other and with additional transna-
tional actors to put GFAs into effect (see also McCallum 2013) so that their
position mediates HQ strategies. Surprisingly, location in a right-to-work
state in the United States did not affect GFA implementation in our cases.
Third, MNEs develop different organizational structures for coordinating
product divisions or setting up regional headquarters independently from
home country institutions. As our two Swedish cases with globally integrated
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product divisions indicate, these structures may influence the extent to
which HQ management supports the translation of LR practices. However,
whether more decentralized structures pose actual constraints on manage-
ment’s capacity to implement GFAs or whether they strategically serve to
support a hands-off approach needs to be explored in further research. In
the case of RubberCorpDE, for instance, the company exerts a direct influ-
ence on LRs despite having decentralized product divisions. Additionally, as
indicated by PapCorpSE, the translation of LR might also be occasionally
easier in greenfield sites than in acquired ones if an MNE is committed to
the GFA. If not, greenfield facilities are usually not easy to unionize, as the
practices in RubberCorpDE’s joint venture show.
Fourth, against our initial expectations we did not observe sectoral differ-
ences, although the companies in the construction and consumer goods
sector share several similarities and the two GUFs are associated with differ-
ent global strategies. GUFs, however, cover several sectors and many differ-
ent unions, and our cases indicate that their strategies are adapted to a
given situation. ICEM, for instance, played an active role in forcing
RubberCorpDE to formally recognize its GFA commitments in the United
States, but it also could not prevent the company from marginalizing the
more active works council. At PapCorpSE, ICEM largely followed the lead
of U.S. and Swedish unions. The BWI generally took a softer approach, and
yet both construction MNEs exhibit very divergent behavior. We interpret
these findings as supporting our conjecture that more research is needed
on the role of home country institutions as mediators of transnational LR
initiatives.
Our findings have important implications for institutional analyses of
transfer processes more generally. In particular, they reiterate that the
macro-level perspective of the varieties of capitalism and institutional dis-
tance frameworks cannot always capture the range of more fine-grained
firm-level dynamics, here, those affecting collective representation practices
(Lamare et al. 2013). Hence, we would not generalize from our qualitative
data that all German and Swedish MNEs will follow the patterns we identi-
fied. However, they indicate that different micro-political opportunity struc-
tures, here those ensuing from monistic versus dualistic LR systems in
MNEs’ home countries, are an important theoretical dimension to consider
in further analyses of the dynamics evolving around the transnational trans-
fer processes (see also Fichter and McCallum 2015).
Our data shed light on only a relatively short moment of the entire pro-
cess around GFAs. However, short follow-up interviews for each case indi-
cate that the trends we identified were continued. PapCorpSE updated and
strengthened its GFA in 2013, and ConCorpSE is about to renegotiate its
GFA with a specific eye on U.S. operations. No such activities are present in
the German firms. Yet further research is clearly needed to elaborate on
the differential impact of monistic and dualistic LR systems on transnational
LR in other sectors and other host countries.
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